

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

17 April 1953

Copy No. 60

**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN**

Office of Current Intelligence

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

SECURITY INFORMATION

SUMMARY

GENERAL

- ✓ 1. Molotov agrees to clarify position of Italian prisoners (page 3).

SOVIET UNION

- ✓ 3. [REDACTED] 25X1  
✓ 3. Comment on Pravda attack against dictatorial control of Communist Party (page 4).

FAR EAST

- ✓ 4. Yoshida seen likely to remain as Japan's prime minister (page 4).

SOUTHEAST ASIA

5. Declaration of autonomous state threatened in East Java (page 5).

NEAR EAST - AFRICA

6. Comment on current Iranian situation (page 6). 25X1

[REDACTED]

\* \* \* \*

[REDACTED] 25X1


- 2 -

[REDACTED] 25X1

SECURITY INFORMATION

## GENERAL

### 1. Molotov agrees to clarify position of Italian prisoners:




Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov has assured the Italian Ambassador that the recent amnesty in the USSR also applied to foreigners and that he would

take steps to clarify the position of Italian prisoners sentenced as war criminals. The overture was in response to the Ambassador's inquiry during a recent courtesy call.

25X1

Comment: The USSR has repeatedly asserted that it held only war criminals, not prisoners of war. Molotov's statement may foreshadow a token release of German, French, Spanish and Japanese war criminals without compromising the previous Soviet position.




25X1

Although this is the first official notice that the amnesty decree applies to foreigners, a British subject already has been released under the decree.

25X1

## SOVIET UNION

25X1



- 3 -



25X1

SECURITY INFORMATION

25X1

3. Comment on Pravda attack against dictatorial control of Communist Party:

Pravda's denunciation on 16 April of the principle of "one person decisions" in the leadership of the Communist Party not only repudiates the basic characteristic of Stalin's regime but also in effect warns against any resumption of dictatorial control.

This is further evidence that no one individual has yet achieved the power necessary for Soviet dictatorship and suggests that some members of the hierarchy are making a concerted effort to forestall such a development.

**FAR EAST**

4. Yoshida seen likely to remain as Japan's prime minister:

The Far East Command believes that Prime Minister Yoshida will be the most likely candidate to head the Japanese Government

25X1

- 4 -

25X1

## SECURITY INFORMATION

following the 19 April Lower House elections. The expected plurality of the Yoshida Liberal Party in the Lower House will give him the largest vote on the first ballot for prime minister, but not a majority. He appears almost certain to win against either a Progressive-Hatoyama or a Socialist candidate on the conclusive second ballot, which is limited to the two candidates receiving the most votes on the first.

Under these conditions the next government would lack the support of a Diet majority and would probably be unstable and of short tenure.

Comment: [REDACTED]

25X1

Yoshida believes that if he can win 200 seats, he can gain sufficient additional conservative support for a Diet majority, but a single-party government seems unlikely. The Yoshida forces have shown unexpected vigor in the campaign.

## SOUTHEAST ASIA

5. Declaration of autonomous state threatened in East Java:

[REDACTED] the

25X1

Army Command in East Java is expected in the next few days to announce its independence of the government because of the government's failure to dismiss all army leaders involved in the anti-Parliament demonstrations of last October. The proposed action allegedly will be supported by the National Party, the Communist Party, and a covert Moslem dissident group.

Comment: The American Embassy reports that the Indonesian Prime Minister conferred with the East Java commander on 15 April and that the latter now has a "sound understanding" of government policy. The Embassy, however, sees no immediate solution of the basic army problems of insubordination and bitter political factionalism.



25X1

SECURITY INFORMATION

## NEAR EAST - AFRICA

6. Comment on current Iranian situation:

The failure of the Iranian Parliament to meet on 16 April again underscores Prime Minister Mossadeq's current political weakness. The parliamentary deadlock will presumably continue until enough pro-Mossadeq deputies return to Tehran to offset the opposition's boycott.

Despite this evident weakness, Mossadeq's extensive opposition is disunited and is said to have temporarily abandoned plans for a coup because the Shah has refused active support. The prime minister, on the other hand, controls the Army Chief of Staff, has a large popular following, which the Tudeh has temporarily joined, and commands the support of a compact bloc of parliamentary votes.

Neither the prime minister nor his opposition appears at present strong enough to win decisive control of the government. Until the parliamentary impasse is resolved, the possibility of serious disorders remains.

25X1

25X1

**Page Denied**